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Introduction
Whenever one mentions the provision of infertility
treatment in developing countries, the reaction of the
people is almost unanimously negative. reports over
the last decades have inculcated in people from
Western countries the belief that overpopulation is
the major problem of developing countries. This
 conviction was and still is the main barrier to even
consider infertility treatment in resource-poor
 countries. This conviction leads to a bias in Western
people’s way of looking at the provision of contra-
ception and fertility control in resource-poor coun-
tries. For them, these technologies are ways to
reduce population growth, not means to address the
needs of people to control when and how many chil-
dren to have. Worries of people in rich countries
about immigration and fears of being overrun by the
south probably also play a role (Grimes, 1998).
 nevertheless, things are very slowly changing. a
pivotal point for the new evolution was the Confer-
ence on population and Development in 1994 in
Cairo on reproductive health. The conference
adopted a definition of reproductive health that in-
tegrates both fertility control and infertility treatment
in general family planning. ‘reproductive health is
a state of complete physical, mental and social well-
being and not merely the absence of disease or
 infirmity, in all matters relating to the reproductive
system and to its functions and processes. reproduc-
tive health therefore implies that people are able to
have a satisfying and safe sex life and that they have
the capability to reproduce and the freedom to decide
if, when and how often to do so’ (United nations,
1994). Family planning implies both avoiding
 unwanted children and having wanted children.
Framing infertility treatment in the general context
of reproductive health and family planning is crucial
for the ethical evaluation. 
Two preliminary warnings should be issued. First,
we should be aware of the large heterogeneity of
 ‘developing’ countries in terms of wealth, population
growth, health care resources etc. This point may
have a huge impact on the debate as people may
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think of very different countries when they discuss
infertility treatment in developing countries. if
 people think of soudan, sierra Leone or rwanda,
countries which have been the battlefield of civil
wars for decades, lacking a central government and
minimal medical infrastructure or organization, it is
not surprising that they are baffled by the suggestion
of introducing in vitro fertilization (iVF) there. in
order to prevent such misunderstandings, we stipu-
late that infertility treatment can only be considered
when two conditions are fulfilled, namely minimal
political stability and a minimal basic structure of
health care provisions. secondly, the discussion fre-
quently focuses on high technological interventions
like iVF. however, other interventions of a lower
technical nature can be offered to treat infertility. The
general consensus at the arusha meeting was that
there are three levels of technical difficulty: iUi, iVF
and iCsi. The technical level as well as the timing
of the introduction of a technique will have to be
country-specific, depending on the wealth and the
general development (Van balen and Gerrits, 2001). 
Pronatalism, patriarchy and suffering 
reproduction and fertility have a different meaning
in Western and non-Western countries (Van balen
and inhorn, 2002). in developed countries, reproduc-
tion is a self-chosen goal and a largely personal
choice made by an individual or couple. although
there are attempts by others to influence a couple’s
family planning, these attempts have no moral basis.
in non-Western societies, having children is also a
social obligation, a performance that is due to the
family (-in-law) and the community. social pressure
and stigmatization are logical consequences of this
position. norm violations are generally met with
 repudiation or sanctions. The different meaning of
infertility and parenthood is mirrored in the motives
people have for wanting to become parents. Children
secure one’s marriage, confer social status, guarantees
rights of property and inheritance, assist with labour,
offer social security in old age and provide continuity
by maintaining the family name (Dyer, 2007). 
The significance of involuntary infertility is so-
cially constructed and gender roles play a major role
in constituting the social meaning of infertility. This
is true in the developed as well as the developing
world (becker and nachtigall, 1994). infertility is at
least in part a cultural problem, generated by
 pronatalist and patriarchal ideologies. a pronatalist
society holds the belief that a person’s social and
moral worth is linked to reproduction (Ulrich and
Weatherall, 2000). The more one believes in the
 cultural construction of infertility, the more one will
believe that infertility should be tackled not by treat-
ing the infertile but by targeting the ideologies that
cause the problem (sandelowsky and de Lacey,
2002). still, also in largely egalitarian societies,
 people want children as part of their life plan and
they suffer when they cannot realize this wish.
 however, because parenthood has deeper social
roots in developing countries, the social and psycho-
logical consequences of involuntary childlessness
are often more severe. not surprisingly, the problem
of infertility in developing countries is frequently
introduced by pointing at the large impact on the
lives of men and especially women (Ombelet and
Campo, 2007). ‘Common scenarios include unstable
 marriages, divorce, polygamy and ostracism of the
women’ (Vayena et al., 2002). especially for women,
social status and female identity depend on their abil-
ity to produce children. ‘They [the women] are usu-
ally blamed for infertility and can be ostracized and
assaulted by their families, even driven to suicide or
killed. by supporting the development of low-cost
iVF, governments can help make such  treatments
more widely available’ (editorial, 2006). as the
 previous quote shows, low-cost iVF is  proposed as
a solution to the social problems of the infertile. 
according to the main ethical theory, i.e.
 utilitarianism, one should do whatever maximizes
happiness or well-being. a utilitarian could defend
that it is best to cure infertility in countries with the
direst consequences. More well-being would be
 created or more unhappiness avoided by providing
assisted reproductive technology (arT) to a couple
in africa than to a couple in europe. however, it is
not clear to what extent these negative consequences
of infertility in developing countries justify the
 provision of infertility treatment. Two reactions are
possible. The first reaction is to focus on changing
the existing moral and social order so that infertile
people will no longer be ostracized and discrimi-
nated. We should adopt measures to diminish the
pronatalist ideology and its undesirable conse-
quences. This can be done in several ways. an
 important step is education as a means for women to
obtain a job which gives them an alternative route to
increase their self-esteem and to ensure economic
 independence and security. The second reaction is to
provide infertility treatment as a medical solution for
a social problem. Many current health problems, like
obesity, are solved by medical interventions. From a
utilitarian position, the choice between these
 reactions can only be made on empirical evidence.
if more well-being can be gained by avoiding the
 social and psychological consequences than by
 providing arT, the former should be done. 
if a pronatalist society justifies provision of
 infertility treatment, does a sexist society justify
 social sexing? Women who are unable to give birth
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to a son are also discriminated. Like infertility, it is
a reason for a man to divorce his wife (Chan et al.,
2002). Mothers who have only daughters in india
and China undergo ostracism, are at risk for suicide,
and often face beatings, divorce or fatal ‘accidents’
(holmes, 1995). The main argument against this
analogy is that wanting a child is acceptable while
wanting a child of a certain sex is unacceptable.
however, this presupposes that there are standards
to judge the acceptability of wishes, rules and
 practices independent of the culture. The acceptance
of pronatalism, however, seems to be based on the
conviction that Western people should not judge
other societies which attribute a different value to
parenthood. Those who argue in favour of infertility
treatment in pronatalist societies on the basis of
 cultural autonomy, should also defend social sexing
in sexist, patriarchal and misogynist societies.
 Cultural relativism cannot be adopted whenever one
agrees with a deviant practice and rejected when one
disagrees. My position is that discrimination on the
basis of health or disability (to have children) is
 unacceptable and pronatalism leads to such discrimi -
nation. Moreover, the highly negative consequences
for infertile people and the fact that some people will
remain infertile even with high-tech infertility treat-
ment are good reasons to attenuate the pronatalist
 attitude. 
Overpopulation 
One of the demographic paradoxes is that countries
with the highest overall fertility are also those in
which the prevalence of secondary infertility is
 highest (nachtigall, 2006). it is highly unlikely that
high-tech interventions will have an impact on the
population in developing countries since only a
small minority of the population can afford them.
however, it does not really matter whether only a
small additional number of children will be created
by arT. it could be argued that any child that is
added to the already excessive population growth, is
one too many. however, this argument would count
against every new child, regardless of how it came
into being. in its extreme form, the argument would
lead to the conclusion that an overpopulated country
should promote measures causing infertility. how-
ever, the reasoning of some authors that this implies
that we would not have a reason to save people’s
lives in developing countries makes little sense
(Daar and Merali, 2002). There is an enormous dif-
ference between letting existing people die and not
bringing potential people into existence. in the latter
case, no one is harmed. 
The overpopulation argument attributes a high
value to societal benefits at the expense of the
 individual. The personal good is sacrificed for the
sake of a collective or aggregate good. These
 individual rights have a very high status in their
 negative form. That explains why we so strongly
 reject coercive (eugenic) measures like forced ster-
ilization. in fact, people who use the overpopulation
argument to deny infertile persons access to arT use
the same reasoning as people from the eugenics
movement use to deny some people the right to re-
produce for the sake of society. nevertheless, there
may be circumstances in which coercive measures
to defend the public good are justified. This is the
case when it can be shown with reasonable certainty
that a major catastrophe can only be avoided by
 infringing people’s rights. This justification is not
applicable to the overpopulation problem because
population growth can be restricted much more
 effectively by other means that do not infringe peo-
ple’s rights such as educating women, providing
contraception and safe abortions etc. 
The second argument against the reference to
overpopulation is related to distributive justice: the
total burden of the overpopulation should not be
 carried by the infertile alone. Why should they alone
remain childless? One could for instance encourage
fertile people to have fewer children. China has
given the example of an egalitarian approach to the
overpopulation problem with its one-child-per-fam-
ily policy. regardless of the objections one may have
against this system, it is certainly a more balanced
and just measure than the proposal that infertile
 couples should remain childless because their neigh-
bours have too many children (and even more than
they want themselves). The child wish expresses a
personal need that cannot be satisfied by the neigh-
bours having a child (shah, 1994). referring to the
children of others to explain the refusal to assist the
infertile in having children demonstrates a serious
misconception of what it means to want a child.
Prioritization and limited resources 
Most developing countries are struggling to provide
a basic minimum of care. They are confronted with
immense problems of poverty and deprivation of the
most basic goods like clean drinking water and food,
which also affect the general health of the popula-
tion. a mean life expectancy around 50 years is no
exception in developing countries. The question then
becomes whether governments should not spend
their money trying to resolve these problems rather
than embarking on expensive high-technology
 programmes for non-life threatening conditions like
infertility. When considering this question, we have
to look at the broader picture of the allocation of the
total national budget. Most developing countries
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spend, 5% of their gross national product on health
care and the largest part thereof is private money
(World health Organisation, 2007). if we accept this
starting point, the provision of high technology
 infertility care obviously implies that already under-
funded and essential programmes like maternal and
child care will receive even less money. however,
there is no reason why we should accept the existing
health care budget as fixed. On the contrary, there
are very good reasons to urge the governments to
 increase the public health care budget. The whole
 resource allocation policy should be questioned and
evaluated. For instance, what percentage is spend in
those countries on military equipment or prestige
projects? south africa is organizing the world cham-
pionship football in 2010 which will cost around
2 billion euro. should the country not rather spend
this money on helping aiDs victims or treating
 infertility? Generally speaking, the inability to pay
for health care and other basic needs is due more to
mismanagement of funds than to the lack of re-
sources. allocating additional funding to health care
would considerable improve the global situation.
still, regardless of the amount that is directed at
health care, we will still have to discuss to which
treatments the money will be given (pennings and
Ombelet, 2007). 
The ambiguous status of infertility puts it in a
 disadvantaged position when different needs are
ranked. infertility is not life threatening and is not
even considered as a disease by many people. This
means that it loses against almost any other lifesav-
ing health-related service. This is confirmed by the
currently most frequently used method for ranking
diseases, i.e. Quality adjusted Life year and its
 mirror concept Disability adjusted Life years
(DaLy). The DaLy is a measurement technique to
assess the overall burden of a disease. it includes
both the time lost due to premature death (mortality)
and the time lived with a disability (morbidity). One
does not need much imagination to see that combin-
ing both quality of life and length of life in one single
number is difficult. This index runs into serious
 conceptual and methodological problems (arnesen
and nord, 1999). nevertheless, the DaLys are put
forward by the World health Organisation and the
World bank as the basis for public health policy and
resource allocation. The DaLys are used to deter-
mine the priorities for the allocation of health care
resources. Given this practical use, it is extremely
important to review and refine the process to make
sure that infertility, and reproductive health in
 general, is ranked at the position it deserves. in the
international Classification of Diseases (iCD), which
is the basis for the calculation of the DaLys, infer-
tility is included only as a disability outcome of
 sexually transmitted diseases (sTD) and postpartum
and post-abortal sepsis and not as a non-fatal disease
in its own right (abouZhar, 2000). The calculation
method, moreover, raises a number of difficult
 questions when applied to infertility. For instance,
the DaLys are calculated by multiplying the ex-
pected duration of the disability by a disability
weight that measured the severity of the disease
compared with death. This would imply that, in
cases of primary infertility, a man or woman would
be  infertile from the age of 18 till approximately 45.
it would be odd to talk of infertility before and after
the natural reproductive life span. Moreover, infer-
tility is only a disability when there is a child wish.
Women becoming infertile due to abortions or pelvic
inflammatory disease at an age at which they have
no further child wish, will not consider themselves
disabled (Vos, 2001). nevertheless, the (primary)
 infertile persons will continue to suffer the
 consequences of their disability after the reproduc-
tive period because of a lack of support during old
age. These conceptual problems are caused by the
focus on ‘infertility’ as a disability while the effects
are connected to childlessness. a second problem is
that socioeconomic, cultural and environmental
 factors are excluded in determining the burden of
disease. infertility has important social (exclusion,
ostracism etc.) and economic consequences (poverty
in old age, divorce etc.) that are not incorporated in
the DaLy. Third, the disease of one person may af-
fect the well-being of others. infertility is a disability
of a couple in Western countries, but influences the
well-being of the larger family of both partners in
developing countries. Fourth, the DaLys have been
criticized because the burden of disease is largely
 determined by experts and epidemiologists while
people’s own perceptions are left out of the calcula-
tion. When community members are questioned
about the value of certain health states, some dis-
eases which are fairly trivial from a clinical point of
view, move up in the ranking despite their low preva-
lence. One study showed that socially stigmatized
conditions like erectile dysfunction and infertility are
considered more serious than non-stigmatized con-
ditions (Kapiriri and norheim, 2002). studies in
nigeria, Mozambique and south africa revealed that
life without children is perceived as unhappy and not
worth living (Dyer, 2007). The clinical criteria used
in the calculation of DaLys strongly underestimate
the impact of certain conditions, like infertility and
skin diseases, on a person’s life. This is a plea to
 extend the criteria used to calculate the DaLy of a
disability in order to obtain a more complete picture
of the global effect on a person’s quality of life. 
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Prevention 
The ‘prevention’ argument is a specified version of
the ‘prioritization’ argument. it expresses the
 conviction that the available resources should be
 directed first towards programmes to prevent
 infertility. Okonofua (1996) gives three reasons for
this position: (i) prevention programmes are less
 expensive, benefit a greater number of people and
are more effective in eliminating the social conse-
quences of infertility; (ii) prevention programmes
will improve the health status of women in other
ways and (iii) such programmes could provide
 impetus for the utilization of other prevention
 services, such as family planning. in general, there
is little doubt that prevention is better than cure. Cure
and therapy usually is more painful and burdensome.
Moreover, for diseases such as aiDs, there is no
cure. however, some moral points can be raised
against the automatic priority given to prevention. in
allocating medical treatment, one of the important
criteria is medical need. people who are ill normally
have priority on healthy people. When resources are
allocated almost exclusively to prevention, one
 ignores the people who already attracted the disease
(Verweij, 2007). 
it helps to distinguish a ‘moderate’ and a ‘radical’
form of the ‘prevention’ argument. The radical form
defends the position that all available resources
should be directed completely at prevention. The
 untenability of the radical ‘prevention’ argument can
be shown by looking at the response to aiDs. Most
countries spend a lot of money and health care
 resources providing anti-retroviral therapy to hiV
positive persons. if the prevention/cure distinction
would be an all or nothing question, they should
spend all their money on prevention and let the
 infected persons die. The moderate form of the
 prevention argument states that priority should be
given to prevention but, depending on a number of
criteria, one should also direct part of the resources
to cure. The criteria to determine the distribution are,
among others, the degree of scarcity of the resources,
the cost-effectiveness of both prevention and cure
and the difference in cost between the two. i find the
argument about the double benefit of preventive
measures particularly strong for numerous reasons.
First, the prevention of aiDs, infections etc. is real-
ized by securing other rights of (mostly) women. ac-
cess to safe abortions not only prevents tubal
infections, but also respects women’s right to control
their fertility. secondly, although the preventive
measures are directed at healthy people, they are the
ones most at risk of infertility due to lack of contra-
ceptive devices and untreated sTDs (Luna, 2002).
Finally, cure without prevention would be a waste of
effort: the number of infertile couples would con-
tinue to grow and no developing country will have
the means to treat all these people by means of arT.
‘The development of expensive iVF units, whether
public or private, in countries where there are no
 programmes for the prevention and early manage-
ment of sTDs, amounts to a national crime’ (Toubia,
1994). in conclusion, the government should give
priority to prevention when allocating resources for
public health. however, this does not mean that no
money should go to infertility treatment at all,
 especially not when treatment can be made less
 expensive. One should not ignore the plight of the
people who are infertile now. 
Justice 
equity in health care means equal access to basic
health care without excessive burdens. health care
in general is important because it secures the normal
range of opportunities and allows people to flourish.
The question of justice in health care is not limited
to developing countries. The difference between
 developed and developing countries is a matter of
gradation. poor people in rich countries without
 insurance coverage for infertility treatment have no
access to high-tech treatment either. in the United
states, for instance, access to iVF is limited
 primarily to middle-or upper-class persons. access
to treatment can be determined by looking at the cost
of infertility treatment in comparison to the mean
 income. in developing countries, the cost borne by
the infertile patients themselves for iVF is more than
half of the average annual income of the citizens
(Collins, 2002). in resource-poor countries, infertil-
ity treatment is almost exclusively provided in
 private hospitals to the upper-class. 
The principle of justice contains two dimensions:
equality and access. Justice can be promoted by
 either increasing equality (no one has access or
everyone has access) of by increasing access (the
more people can obtain the treatment the better). The
people who focus on equality tend to conclude that
when access cannot be guaranteed for everyone, no
one should have access. This results in what
 engelhardt has called an ‘ethics of envy’: if i cannot
have it, no one should. This difference in emphasis
is important in the discussion. regardless of the
techniques that will be used and the cost reductions
that can be realized, not every infertile person in
 developing countries will have access to infertility
treatment. people who focus on equality believe that
no action should be taken unless everyone (including
the poorest) can obtain treatment. i think on the con-
trary that cost reduction for infertility treatment is
morally defensible even if the treatment is only
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available to the more affluent groups in society be-
cause it increases the number of people who can af-
ford treatment. Moreover, a small decrease in cost
may result in a much higher increase in utilization
(Collins, 2002). nevertheless, the ideal situation
combines equality and universal access. This can be
obtained in several ways, either by reimbursement
of treatment through public funding, affordable pri-
vate health insurance or direct cost reduction. Given
the problems encountered in resource-poor coun-
tries, the latter is the most realistic route. all parties
can contribute to this goal. pharmaceutical compa-
nies can provide cheaper drugs as they do for aiDs.
researchers and professional organizations can in-
vest in cheaper, more effective and simpler proce-
dures to facilitate introduction in less sophisticated
health care systems and physicians can work for
minimal fees. 
There are two considerations to keep in mind
when private clinics start to offer high-technology
infertility treatment. One argument is that it does not
affect others when people have to pay for arT out-
of-pocket. however, this is only correct when direct
costs are taken into account. One should take into
account the indirect costs in terms of health care re-
sources and capacity. The private clinics will attract
scarce qualified people like embryologists and
 gynaecologists with higher wages. The ‘health
 conveyor belt’ shifts qualified personnel from public
to private clinics. The end result is an exodus from
the public health sector (schrecker and Labonte,
2004). Moreover, one should also beware of ‘cream
skimming’: doctors in public hospitals refer public
hospital patients to their private practices for follow-
up and more sophisticated treatment if, of course, the
patients are willing and able to pay (sundby, 2002;
inhorn, 2007). This leaves the public hospitals with
only poor patients. 
Finally, one should think proactively about a
 number of problems that will arise when low-cost
iVF will be introduced without public funding. Low-
cost does not mean that everyone will be able to
 afford it or will have access. This raises the question
of which criteria (if any) should be used to rank the
patients. One possibility would be to exclude, at least
as long as there is great scarcity, secondary infertil-
ity. it can be argued that the scarce resources should
first go to men and women who have no child of
their own. a second issue is more related to cost-
 effectiveness. The treatment of some categories of
patients will be more expensive than that of others.
in the present discussion, severe male factor infer-
tility is not included because iCsi cannot be per-
formed for the same price as ‘standard’ iVF. The
same  applies to hiV positive persons who need
infertility treatment. The inclusion of these patients
automatically implies that fewer patients can be
treated with the same amount of money. 
Abuse and exploitation of patients 
The patient -physician relationship is characterized
by a power imbalance. This is due both to the
 vulnerability of the sick person and to the inequality
in terms of knowledge and skills. This inequality
holds a possibility of abuse by the more powerful
party that can only be avoided by the virtuousness
of the physician (his or her integrity) combined with
regulation. several authors have expressed their con-
cern about the high rates of medical malpractice in
the management of infertility in the developing
world (Macklin, 1995; van Zandvoort et al., 2001;
aboulghar et al., 2007). ‘Unregulated private prac-
tices offer considerable potential for making large
profits from infertile women, and this can attract
doctors who are more interested in wealth than ‘good
practice’ (aboulghar et al., 2007). This danger
 obviously is linked to any profit-driven practice, in
developed as well as developing countries. The
chance of abuse may be higher when patients are
 uneducated, desperate and willing to invest all their
savings. The risk may be exacerbated by the lack of
knowledge, experience and competence on the part
of the practitioners (Macklin, 1995). however, the
solution is not to prevent or block the introduction
of high-technology infertility treatment but to
 regulate the practice by licensing providers, close
monitoring of the activities and verifying results. 
Conclusion 
Most arguments against the provision of infertility
treatment in developing countries cannot be sus-
tained. On the contrary, a combination of measures
such as increased investment in health care and con-
siderable reduction of the cost of arT would justify
at least some public funding. however, given the
 difficulties of resource-poor countries, the lion’s
share of the effort should be directed at the preven-
tion of infertility. 
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